The most recommended books about national security

Security is the prime issue in the international politics of the Gulf. Not just in the narrow military sense. In the broadest sense too. This book takes a comprehensive and in-depth look at the multitude of risks the Arab Gulf states faces, not only military kind (read Iran), but also food and water, environment and climate, sustaining standards of living in the face of a multitude of economic challenges and potential regional state failures. This book is unquestionably a must-read to have a deeper understanding of the complexity of problems the Arab Gulf states have to resolve, some of which are unique to the Gulf, some are not. It will be epic to survive them.

Amoroso’s experience started with academic research at Bell Labs and Stevens Institute of Technology but moved quickly to practically fill voids at AT&T and NSA. His book reduces technical concepts in cybersecurity to basic principles and explains generically how they are effectively implemented. For the true techy who wants to fully understand all the formal logic behind the theories in Cyber Attacks, reach back to Ed Amoroso’s Fundamentals of Computer Security Technology (1994). 

In The Peacemaker, William Inboden draws on declassified materials, interviews with high-level government officials, and on Reagan’s personal diary to write the most thorough, fair, and scrupulously researched account of Reagan’s foreign policy and the successful end of the Cold War.

And he does this with such aplomb that his history reads like a novel. I worked in the US government in the 1980s and thought I knew Reagan’s foreign policy well, but I discovered much that was new and couldn’t put the book down.

This book entertains while recounting the militarization of our foreign policy. Post-retirement, I worked briefly for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and later as a contractor helping to train military units headed for Iraq and Afghanistan. Our professional military is a superb fighting machine but the decisions to invade Iraq and Afghanistan inevitably resulted in challenges diplomats and development workers are best equipped to handle. The budget-slashing reinvention of government during the Clinton years meant there weren’t enough trained civilians to handle existing priorities much less a surge to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. As Rosa Brooks writes, from the perspective of both an insider and a superb reporter, the military became everything. The military had the money while civilian agencies like State and USAID were underfunded.

This book is not McNamara’s most famous nor original–it essentially weaves together his speeches to provide reflections about war and nuclear weapons–but is arguably his most compelling.

The shadow of Ellsberg and his colleagues who wrote many of these speeches is present and shows a distinct subculture that existed around McNamara, who was far more refined than the warmonger stereotype suggests and also dedicated to educating the American people about national security. It shows a man sitting atop the world’s most powerful defense establishment, grappling with important moral dilemmas, including its enormous capacity for human destruction and institutional pressures toward war.

In 1960, a planned summit meeting in Paris between the US, the USSR, England, and France was suddenly jeopardized when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia and the pilot captured. Khrushchev demanded an end to the flights and an apology. President Eisenhower agreed to suspend flights until the end of his term (nine months later), but the Soviet leader angrily denounced the offer and returned to Moscow. Ironically, President Kennedy’s concern in 1962 about “another U-2 crisis” convinced him to suspend U-2 flights over Cuba—a pause that lasted from late August to early October. JFK did agree to authorize one flight over western Cuba in response to pressure from CIA director John McCone—and the missiles were luckily discovered just before they had become operational.

This is a great book about former CIA Director Richard Helms and the agency he directed.  Helms was the quintessential CIA man, and Powers tells the story of his 30-year career in spying in this beautifully written book, which somehow captures both Helms’ elusiveness and his essence.

The current war in Ukraine cannot be understood without reference to the rampant misunderstandings and misperceptions that animate both sides. 

This book is the bible of misperception, and for my money, the greatest book ever written about international politics. In it, Jervis explains how countries rarely understand one another; misperception is the rule in national security, not the exception. And those misperceptions all point in one direction: They make other actors appear more belligerent than they are.

Because of predictable psychological processes, we tend to think that they can’t be trusted....and as a result, cycles of hostility and misperception follow. And finally, war.

If I could get presidents to read one book of political science, this would be it.

Bolton is a serious man who has worked for three American administrations. He understands strategy and policy. He knows incompetence when he sees it.

In Trump’s White House, Bolton struggles to work with Trump’s “basket of incorrigibles” and incompetents. The good people leave; too many incompetents stay. Bolton describes an Administration in constant chaos and a President with the attention span of a toddler. It offers deep insight into how Trump’s policies were always based on his personal interests rather than national priorities. It also offers a first-hand account of how long and meeting-filled the days are for senior officials.

The memoir has no axe to grind. Bolton is not vindictive. He doesn’t skewer opponents and colleagues. There are no debts to settle. All of this makes it quite readable.

More than any other writer, Flynn explained the value and need for resilient critical infrastructure. He distinguished between foreseeable and unforeseeable threats, and made clear that we can reduce the risk and impact of both. Since 9/11, anything purporting to discuss protection/security and resilience was skewed to terrrorism, giving scant consideration to more fundamental changes in our world. Flynn brought this broader perspective to the fore, and I would like to believe he influenced political and academic thinking. I fear he was the Cassandra to the business community, who are only now starting to understand the risks they face. I made this book core reading for all the infrastructure courses I teach. It is clear, simple, and sets each concept in context with an unambiguous call to action.